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For policy purposes, it is important to understand the relative efficacy of various methods to 
target the poor. Recently, participatory methods have received particular attention. We ex-
amine the effectiveness of a hybrid two-step process that combines a participatory wealth 
ranking and a verification household survey, relative to two proxy means tests (the Progress out 
of Poverty Index and a housing index), in Honduras and Peru. The methods we examine per-
form similarly to one another by various metrics. They all target most accurately in the cases of 
the poorest and the wealthiest households but perform with mixed results among households 
in the middle of the distribution. Ultimately, given similar performance, the analysis suggests 
that costs should be the driving consideration in choosing across methods. 
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1 Introduction 
Effectively identifying the appropriate recipients for aid programs is critical in order to max-
imize social impact with scarce resources. The erroneous inclusion of a household that is not 
part of the target population generally means resources wasted. Yet effective targeting is not 
costless. In theory, the economics are straightforward: screen such that the marginal cost of 
screening out the marginal ineligible participant is equal to the wasted resources transferred as 
a result of mistargeting. 
Targeting poor households is difficult because the criteria for eligibility may be hard both to 
define and to verify. As there is no single defining characteristic of poverty, criteria for eligibility 
tend to be multidimensional and subject to much debate. Poverty lines based on per capita 
income or expenditure are often used, but it is also well recognized that they have limitations 
and represent a simplification of what it means to be poor (Ravallion 1998; Bebbington 1999; 
Alwang, Siegel, and Jorgensen 2001).  
Once the relevant criteria are defined, verifying that certain households meet those criteria 
poses its own challenges. Measuring income for poor families, for example, is notoriously chal-
lenging: it derives mostly from informal sources and is often in kind rather than monetary (Dea-
ton 1997). Verification may be further complicated when respondents, wishing to participate in 
the program, perceive an incentive to misreport information related to their eligibility. Such 
challenges may create a trade-off between accuracy and cost in identifying eligible households.  
The challenges of verification require cost-effective solutions to targeting particular house-
holds. Three methods have been broadly proposed as solutions (Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott 
2002). First is geographic targeting, which uses national or regional poverty maps to select eli-
gible households by region. While typically less precise relative to other methods, geographic 
targeting may suffice as an inexpensive and quick method in certain circumstances.  Even when 
other selection methods are used, geographical targeting is often applied as a first filter. A 
second method is a proxy means test (PMT), in which field workers collect demographic, asset 
or housing information that can be used to approximate a household’s poverty status. Com-
pared to measurements of income or consumption, the inputs required for a PMT are both 
quicker to collect and easier to verify. However, for any PMT there is a substantial risk of target-
ing error. Moreover, PMTs typically lack transparency, potentially leading to accusations of fa-
voritism or incompetence, which could undermine the legitimacy of the program. A third me-
thod is selection by village members themselves. The criteria for selection can range from nom-
ination by local leaders to ranking through a Participatory Wealth Ranking (PWR). A PWR invites 
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village members to rank members of their community according to poverty levels. The poorest 
members, typically, are then eligible for the program. The increasing popularity of PWRs re-
flects a broader trend towards Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRAs) to collect information and 
design aid programs (Chambers 1994). Such participatory processes have the advantage of 
transparency and the incorporation of local knowledge, which is likely to be more precise than 
a PMT. On the other hand, there are a number of reasons why a PWR may not work well in 
practice. Local elites may manipulate the participatory process in order to include themselves, 
their family or members of a particular group. Moreover, local definitions of poverty may differ 
from the criteria of the program implementer.   
The relative costs and merits of each method hold important implications for organizations 
seeking to target the poor effectively. PWRs in particular have received academic attention. 
Quantitative evaluations of PWR results using household surveys generally show that PWRs 
effectively identify households that are poor according to traditional measures of wealth. 
Adams et al. (1997) use expenditure, income and asset holdings to validate a PWR in rural Ban-
gladesh, and find significant differences between wealth groups across all traditional socio-
economic variables. Ojiako et al. (2009) and Temu and Due (2000) similarly find that PWRs in 
Nigeria and Tanzania, respectively, successfully identify poorer households. Van Campenhout 
(2006) studies a wealth ranking in rural Tanzania and finds that the wealth categories reflect 
asset holdings and schooling levels.1 
While the results of PWRs are intrinsically interesting in terms of what we can learn about 
perceptions of poverty, their performance relative to other targeting methods is also directly 
relevant for policy. The relatively few studies that have made such comparisons have yielded 
mixed results. In a study in rural South Africa, Hargreaves et al. (2007) compare the results of a 
PWR with two survey-based methodologies that employ principal component analyses (PCA) to 
construct wealth indices. The PWR results are only weakly correlated with the survey-based 
tools, implying that one or the other (or both) is incorrect; however, in the absence of a credi-
ble benchmark it is impossible to determine which is more effective. Banerjee et al. (2007) eva-
luate a two-step targeting process used by Bandhan in India to establish eligibility for the same 
Graduation Program that is discussed in this paper. Using detailed household survey data to 
analyze the process, they find that the PWR approach compares favorably to the census-based 
methods used by the Indian government, although it is important to note that the latter fared 
1 Data were not available to compare the results with household income or expenditure.  
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particularly poorly. Most recently, Alatas et al. (2010) conducted a field experiment in Indonesia 
to compare a PMT and PWR, finding that while the PMT was more accurate when poverty was 
defined in terms of consumption, the villagers themselves were more satisfied with the results 
of the PWR (perhaps because this directly incorporates local conceptions of poverty, or because 
villagers are more satisfied if part of the process, regardless of the outcome).  
We examine the effectiveness of a three-step “Targeting the Ultra-Poor” (“TUP”) process 
relative to other methods in two different contexts, Honduras and Peru. The TUP method com-
bines geographical targeting, PWRs and PMTs; we concentrate especially on steps two and 
three in this paper. The process was used to determine eligibility for the CGAP-Ford Foundation 
Graduation Program. In Gracias, Honduras, the program was implemented in 2008 by Plan In-
ternational Honduras and ODEF Social. In Cusco, Peru, the program was implemented in 2010 
by Plan International Peru and Asociación Arariwa. The programs aim to tackle extreme poverty 
by combining an asset transfer (livestock, e.g.) with training, cash transfers, and health services. 
In both countries, the first step used geographical targeting. The intervention area was de-
termined by the local organizations’ area of operations and reference to regional poverty maps; 
villages were then selected using a simple scorecard. This paper does not evaluate the accuracy 
of this first step of identifying the broad geographical areas. The second and final steps, the 
focus of our analysis, was a PWR in the villages to determine the poorest households, and then 
a verification survey by the NGO that confirmed program eligibility and basic economic status 
questions. Our analysis uses data from a detailed household survey that was administered after 
the targeting process. The survey included the selected (i.e., identified as ultra-poor) house-
holds, as well as a random sample of non-selected (“excluded”) households in the same village. 
In Honduras, 423 selected and 637 excluded households were surveyed in 15 randomly se-
lected villages; In Peru, 470 selected and 537 excluded households were surveyed in 21 ran-
domly selected villages.  
Section 2 of the paper describes the program and the targeting process in both sites. The 
sample and data used for the subsequent analysis are described in Section 3. Section 4 com-
pares the selected and excluded households at each stage in the targeting process across a 
range of variables in each country. Section 5 compares the accuracy of the TUP targeting 
process to two simple PMTs – a housing index and the Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI) – 
using per capita consumption as a benchmark of true poverty. Section 6 compares the perfor-
mance of the TUP targeting process, the housing index and the PPI using other metrics of po-
verty such as assets and vulnerability. Section 7, examines in a regression framework characte-
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ristics that predict a household’s ranking in the PWR in a regression framework. Finally, section 
8 summarizes our results and discusses the policy implications. 
2 The targeting process 
2.1 The CGAP-Ford Foundation Graduation Program in Honduras and Peru 
The Graduation Program aims to help the poorest families “graduate” from extreme pover-
ty within a 24-month period. The program incorporates five core elements: targeting of the 
poorest families, direct consumption support in the short term, access to savings services, one-
to-one skills training and the transfer of a productive asset. The Graduation Program is being 
replicated in 10 pilot sites in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Syed and Montesquiou 2011). In 
two of these sites, Honduras and Peru, we built in additional data collection from the entire 
village, not just the identified participants, in order to analyze the targeting process. 
The Honduras program is operated by Plan International Honduras and a local microfinance 
institution, ODEF Social, in the northern districts of Lempira department. Lempira was chosen 
as the intervention zone because of the high incidence of extreme poverty and because Plan 
already had projects in the area. The Peru program is operated by Plan International Peru and a 
Cusco-based microfinance institution, Asociación Arariwa, in two southern provinces of the 
Cusco department, Canas and Acomayo. As in Honduras, the intervention zones were selected 
according to poverty indicators and the existing presence of the local organizations. 
In both sites, the program implementers first selected the poorest 80 villages in the inter-
vention zone.2 In Honduras, the Plan team already had considerable experience working in the 
area and selected the villages based on their prior observations and perceptions. In Peru, where 
prior knowledge of the project zone was more limited, the Plan team selected villages based on 
a simple scorecard that assessed access to basic services like roads, electricity, water, education 
and healthcare. 
Within selected villages, households were selected using a two-step process. The first step 
was a PWR to which all village members were invited, which is described in Section 2.2. House-
holds selected in this step progressed to the second step, a short verification survey applied by 
Plan field workers that was used to confirm eligibility according to criteria described in Section 
2 In Peru, an additional six villages were later added, bringing the total to 86. 
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2.3. For program impact evaluation, the villages were then randomly assigned to treatment and 
control groups; within treatment villages selected households were also randomly assigned to 
treatment and control groups.  
2.2 The participatory wealth ranking 
All village members were invited to attend the PWR, which followed the geographical selec-
tion of eligible villages. In Honduras, the invitation was sent through local schools. The students 
informed their parents of the meeting that would take place in the school the following day. In 
Peru, Plan field workers went to each village a month prior to the meeting to set a date and 
invite participants. In both countries, field workers stressed the importance of a high level of 
participation and the attendance of women as well as men. In Peru, field workers would go 
ahead with meeting if more than 50% of households were represented, which, in most of the 
villages of the zone, is the established threshold at which communal decisions can be taken; in 
Honduras, the threshold was lower. Monitoring visits conducted by our research assistant at 
five of the meetings in Peru suggest that male participants typically outnumbered female par-
ticipants by about three to one, although in other cases only women participated due to a mi-
sunderstanding of the meeting’s aims. Comments from participants indicated that those who 
lived furthest away, typically the poorest households, were underrepresented at the meetings.  
Each village PWR meeting was run by three field workers in a common area of the village, 
and lasted between two and three hours. In Honduras the meetings were conducted in Spanish, 
while in Peru most meetings were conducted in a mix of Quechua and Spanish, with some field 
workers speaking more in Quechua and others more in Spanish. The monitoring visits in Peru 
suggested that the level of participation, particularly among women, was higher when the 
meeting was predominately conducted in Quechua. After a brief introduction to the imple-
menting organizations and the targeting process, participants prepared a sketch map of the 
village.3 The map included landmarks such as roads, rivers, the school, village hall and different 
neighborhoods. In Honduras the facilitator attempted to engage all members, but in practice 
only two or three people tended to participate in the production of the map, while in Peru a 
group of four people was selected to work on the map whilst the other village members began 
3 In Honduras, no mention was made of the Graduation Program in order not to bias participant behavior in 
the PWR. In Peru, participants were given information only about the training elements of the project. The cash 
consumption stipend and asset transfer were not mentioned. 
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the wealth ranking. In parallel, other village members assisted a field worker in preparing index 
cards with the names of all the household heads in the village. 
In Honduras, the ranking process began with a comparison between two families. For the 
first two households, the field worker read out the name of the household heads and then 
asked the village members if the two households lived in the same conditions. If so, the two 
index cards were placed in the same pile. If one lived better than the other, they were placed in 
separate piles. The field worker then picked up a third index card and asked if this household 
lived in similar, better, or worse conditions than the first two households. The process contin-
ued until all of the households were classified in piles. The number of categories varied be-
tween villages, depending on the responses of the village members. In homogenous villages, it 
was possible that the majority of households were categorized in the same group, although in 
such situations the field worker tried to encourage participants to identify subtle differences. 
The criteria used to distinguish between categories were implicit, rather than formally defined. 
In Peru, on the other hand, the ranking process began with the definition of the wealth cat-
egories. The field worker proposed to the village members that in every village there are “fami-
lies that have the most,” “families that have neither a lot nor little,” “families that have little,” 
and “families that have the least.” In many cases, the initial reaction of the meeting participants 
was to argue that everyone in the village is equally poor. However, with the use of examples, 
the field worker was able to demonstrate to the participants that although all may be poor, 
some are poorer than others. 
Next, the village defined four wealth categories in terms of land, animal ownership and the 
house characteristics. For example, “families that have the most” might be defined as those 
that have more than 50 sheep, eight cows or 10 llamas; more than three masas of land 
(3,150m2); and a house with four or more rooms. The “families that have the least” might have 
fewer than 14 sheep, two cows or three llamas; 0.5 masas (275m2) of land; and a one room 
house. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this rather abstract exercise was difficult for many 
participants, and significant guidance was required from the case worker to produce a logical 
classification.  
Index cards with the name of the household heads were then read out in random order. 
The location of the household was drawn on the village map and the participants decided in 
which category the household belonged. The index card was then placed in a cardboard box 
corresponding to that category. This process created a number of challenges. First, it was a time 
consuming process, particularly in large villages, and participants evidently tired towards the 
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end. Second, there was no established process for handling disputed cases, where some village 
members felt that the household should be in one category and others felt otherwise. Given 
the time constraint, the field worker needed to make a quick decision, and would typically go 
with the option that was being voiced most loudly, or appoint the village president to act as 
arbitrator. In general, there was little reference to the objective criteria established by the par-
ticipants and it was unclear whether the classification of households reflected these criteria or 
not. 
With the ranking complete, the next step at both sites was to determine the PWR catego-
ries that would be eligible for inclusion into the program. In practice, the norm was to select the 
poorest two categories from each village, which was normally over half of the households in the 
village. In poorer villages, the three poorest categories were selected.4 
2.3 The verification step by NGO field workers 
The next step of the TUP targeting process was a verification survey for households selected 
in the PWR. This was conducted by the NGO field workers at each house or in a community 
meeting. During the survey process, case workers would sometimes encounter additional 
households that had either not been ranked in the PWR or who claimed they had been ranked 
incorrectly, and would include these households in the survey. Not all households selected in 
the PWR were surveyed: some had migrated from the community, others were not at home, 
and still others did not meet the inclusion criteria defined for the project.  
The first aim of the verification survey was to verify the suitability of the household for the 
project. We label the criteria used for this purpose the “programmatic” criteria. In Honduras 
the criteria applied were: (1) the household includes a child under the age of 18 to meet Plan’s 
mission of helping children and (2) the household has lived in the village for at least three years. 
In Peru the criteria applied were: (1) the head of the household or their spouse is younger than 
60, and would therefore be capable of managing an enterprise for several years to come; (2) 
the household includes a child under the age of 18 and (3) the household head doesn’t live out-
side the community for more than six months of the year. 
The second aim of the verification survey was to confirm that the household was indeed 
poor, in order to correct for errors or manipulation during the PWR: we label these “poverty” 
4 In a few villages in Honduras, four categories were selected. 
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criteria. In Honduras, this took the form of two criteria: (1) the household has a monthly per 
capita income of 600 Lempira or less, the monthly cost of a basic food basket and (2) the 
household meets at least two of the following three criteria: (a) having one manzana or less of 
land under cultivation5; (b) having minors in the household who work in income-generating or 
productive activities; (c) not currently participating in a development program. In Peru, four 
criteria were used, including a PMT: (1) neither the household head nor the spouse have a for-
mal profession or occupation; (2) the household head does not own a second home outside of 
the community; (3) the household does not currently borrow money from formal sources6; (4) 
the household has a PPI score of 30 or less. The PPI was chosen as a PMT method because it 
was well-tested in Peru and simple to apply and calculate. With a PPI score of 30 or more, there 
is a 50% probability that the household is not below the national poverty line (Schreiner, 2009).  
3 Sample and data 
After the targeting steps were complete, we randomly selected 15 villages (out of 40 treat-
ment villages) from Honduras, and 21 villages (out of 40 treatment villages) from Peru to be 
included in the targeting analysis study. Within each of these communities, an extensive socio-
economic survey was administered to the selected households as part of an impact evaluation 
study. In addition, for the purpose of this targeting analysis, we also surveyed a random sample 
of the excluded households. Since a higher proportion of households selected for the program 
were sampled than those excluded for the program, we use sampling weights throughout the 
analysis to make the sample representative at the village level. In the 15 selected communities 
in Honduras, a total of 1,060 households were surveyed – 423 selected households and 637 
non-selected households, whereas in the 21 villages in Peru 470 selected and 537 non-selected 
households were surveyed, for a total sample of 1,007 households. 
Two filters were applied to define the sample frame for analysis. First, as mentioned above, 
several “programmatic” criteria were applied in the verification step (e.g. presence of a child 
under 18 in the household). These programmatic criteria reflect the priors of the implementing 
organizations about which types of households are suitable for the intervention and do not 
5 One manzana equals about 1.7 acres or 0.7 hectare. 
6 Households that had a loan with the microfinance institution Caja Nuestra Gente, which had recently entered 
into an agreement with the government to provide credit to beneficiaries of the conditional cash transfer scheme, 
Programa JUNTOS, were not excluded. 
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necessarily relate to poverty. To focus on how well the targeting methods select the poor, we 
therefore remove from the sample all households that do not satisfy the programmatic crite-
ria.7  
Second, some households identified as poor in the PWR were not surveyed later in the veri-
fication step. In some cases, there was no respondent available when the NGO field workers 
returned to the community. In other cases, the household could not be located in the commu-
nity. For these households, we do not know whether, had they been surveyed, they would have 
been selected or not. Since we are interested in understanding how each of the steps contri-
buted to the final selection, we discard from the sample the households that were identified as 
poor in the PWR but were not verified by the NGO in the verification survey. After applying 
these two filters, we are left with 897 households in the analysis sample in Honduras and 717 
households in Peru (Table 1 for Honduras and Table 2 for Peru). 
Of the 897 households in the Honduras sample, 702 were categorized as ultra-poor at the 
PWR stage. This corresponds to 62% of households (using sampling weights). Of these, relative-
ly few failed to pass the verification step by the NGO (67 households or 17%).8 Overall, the two-
step TUP targeting process selected 52% of households for the program (conditional on meet-
ing the programmatic criteria). In Peru, 64% of households were identified as ultra-poor at the 
PWR step, and of these, only 14% were excluded at the verification step. In all, 59% of house-
holds in Peru were finally identified as ultra-poor and selected for inclusion into the program. 
The final selection rates in Honduras and Peru – 52% and 59% respectively – may seem high, 
but note that the program villages were purposefully selected because of their high incidence 
of extreme poverty. 
4 Selection at each stage of the TUP process   
We begin our analysis by examining differences between how households are categorized 
at each step of the TUP targeting process. Table 3 (Honduras) and Table 4 (Peru) show the 
means of several welfare indicators for each group at a given step. We compare the groups in 
terms of demographics and education (Panel A), household assets (Panel B), productive assets 
7 Since we do not have data from the verification survey for the households excluded in the PWR step, we 
check programmatic eligibility using our household survey data. 
8 From Table 1, (62%-52%) / 62% = 17%. 
10
and income (Panel C), and consumption, poverty, and vulnerability (Panel D). The number of 
households in each step is displayed in the last row of the table. The total sample sizes in the 
“PWR step” and “Final selection” are the same, while the sample size in the “Verification step” 
is the same as the number of households selected in the PWR.   
4.1 Participatory Wealth Ranking  
In both countries, households selected by the PWR are consistently poorer across a range of 
welfare indicators than households excluded in the PWR. In columns 1 – 3 of Tables 3 and 4, we 
see that all statistically significant differences between those excluded and selected by the PWR 
(N=564 for Peru, N=702 for Honduras) reflect sorting into groups by higher and lower welfare, 
particularly in Honduras where all indicators except whether or not the household is female-
headed and sheep and goat ownership show a statistically significant difference. In both coun-
tries, indicators of education, household assets, productive assets, and consumption, poverty, 
and vulnerability reflect consistent sorting into groups by welfare status. To get a sense of the 
magnitudes of the differences in terms of the underlying variance, we standardize the differ-
ence by the overall standard deviation of the variable of interest (column 4). The largest stan-
dardized differences occur in Honduras for the housing index (0.96), the household asset index 
(0.85) and the years of education of the household head (0.51) and in Peru for the number of 
cattle (0.89), the household asset index (0.65) and the cultivated land area (0.55). 
More statistically significant differences between selected and excluded households emerge 
in Honduras than in Peru. Notably, the PWR in Peru did not sort households by weekly income 
per capita or food security, although the lack of a significant difference for the former may stem 
from the challenge of measuring income. Reported income for both groups is much lower than 
consumption measures, reflecting this challenge.  
4.2 Verification  
Selection at the verification step (Columns 5-8 of Tables 3 and 4) shows fewer statistical-
ly significant differences relative to the PWR. Note however that the number of excluded 
households in this step is small, reducing our power to detect statistically significant differenc-
es. In Honduras, differences emerge in boys’ enrollment, assets (the asset index, latrine owner-
ship, the housing index, and land ownership) and food security, each reflecting sorting consis-
tent with poverty status. In Peru, we find statistically significant differences in the expected 
direction only for girls’ school enrollment and the PPI. The latter is not unexpected given that 
the PPI score was itself one of the criteria used in the verification step. Excluded households 
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have fewer sheep and goats than the selected households. In Peru, sheep and goats are lives-
tock typical of poorer households, with the richer households holding cattle, lamas and alpacas. 
Given the smaller (in standardized units) and fewer differences within the verification 
step relative to the PWR step, it appears that the verification step mostly served to identify and 
correctly exclude a few wealthier households, while the PWR effectively sorted households 
broadly into poor and wealthy categories.  
4.3 Final selection 
Columns 9-12 of Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the complete TUP targeting process, 
comparing households selected in both the PWR and verification steps with those excluded in 
either one.  In both countries, the significant differences in the final selection echo those in the 
PWR.  Taken as a whole, the selection process effectively targeted poorer households according 
to a wide range of indicators. As can be seen in columns 13-14, the PWR was responsible for 
the majority of the differences between the two finally selected and excluded groups in both 
Honduras and Peru.9 
5 TUP targeting in comparison to other targeting methods 
5.1 Consumption per capita as a benchmark 
The mean comparisons examined above indicate that the TUP selection process broadly 
sorted households by welfare status. Such sorting is an important, but not sufficient indication 
of how well the process identifies poor households: the process may have erred more towards 
false positives, or false negatives, which may have important welfare consequences, and the 
process may have worked well but not as well as other methods (or worked equally as well, but 
cost more). We use a well-established measure of poverty, consumption per capita, as a 
benchmark to compare the TUP targeting process with random selection and two PMTs: the PPI 
and a housing index. 
9 The numbers in columns 13-14 indicate the relative contribution of the PWR and verification steps. Let M be 
the mean of the variable of interest, M1 its mean conditional on being selected in the PWR step and M2 the mean 
conditional on being finally selected, the contribution of the PWR is then defined as (M-M1)/(M-M2) and the con-
tribution of the verification step as (M1-M2)/(M-M2). 
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We choose consumption per capita as our benchmark assuming that it represents the best 
available proxy for wellbeing. Caution is needed however, for several reasons. First, the mea-
surement of consumption for poor households is inherently difficult. Respondents do not al-
ways remember their expenditures accurately, do not tend to measure the consumption of 
their own produce in standardized units, and may perceive an incentive to inflate or deflate 
their reported expenditure. Second, survey-based measurement of consumption usually refers 
to a short time period; for some households, those time periods may not be representative of 
their typical consumption habits. Third, households have different consumption preferences: a 
household that chooses to spend as little as possible and save for the future may appear poorer 
than it actually is when consumption is used as the benchmark. Fourth and finally, consumption 
does not capture other dimensions of poverty, such as vulnerability to shocks or social and po-
litical inclusion. In sum, while we consider consumption to be the best benchmark available to 
compare targeting tools, we interpret the results with caution. 
5.2 Other targeting methods 
We compare the TUP selection process with two proxy means tests: the PPI and a housing 
index. The PPI is a poverty scorecard that estimates the likelihood that a household is poor 
based on ten questions related to demographics, education, housing and assets. The informa-
tion takes about five minutes to collect and many of the answers are readily verifiable if the 
questionnaire is performed in the home. Answers to each question correspond to a certain 
number of points; the sum of these points yields a score out of 100 for the overall survey. Each 
score is then associated via a scorecard with a probability that the household falls below the 
poverty line. The scorecard is calibrated using data from the relevant country’s national house-
hold survey. The choice and weighting of indicators is based on their correlation with poverty, 
the ease of collecting and verifying the information, and the liability of the indicator to change 
over time as poverty status changes (Schreiner 2010; Schreiner 2009) 
We constructed a housing index using principal components analysis (PCA), a statistical 
technique often used in the creation of socio-economic status indices from household survey 
data. Five variables were entered into the PCA: the total number of rooms in the house and 
dummy variables indicating whether the house has a cement floor, a cement wall, a latrine and 
electricity access. From this set of correlated variables, PCA creates uncorrelated components 
that explain the variance in the data and thus provide synthesized information on the underly-
ing concept—in this case housing quality. The components are ordered so that the first compo-
nent explains the largest amount of variation in the data (Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006). This 
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first principal component is then used as a relative index of housing quality, which we use as a 
proxy for overall wellbeing. 
5.3 Results 
Our approach evaluates how well the various targeting methods categorize households at 
various deciles in the distribution of consumption per capita. We compare the TUP targeting 
method against a naively random selection, the PPI, and the housing index. For the PPI and 
housing index, we choose the poverty line – i.e. the cut-off value to be categorized as poor –  in 
each country so that the X% of households gets selected where X is the percentage of house-
holds selected by the actual TUP targeting process (52% for Honduras and 59% for Peru). For 
each decile of the consumption distribution, we then calculate the fraction of households in 
that decile that would be selected by a given targeting method. A perfect targeting tool would 
select all households in percentiles of consumption per capita less than X% and not select any 
households in percentiles above X%. A naively random sampling would achieve a rate of X% for 
each decile. 
Table 5 (Honduras) and Table 6 (Peru) show the results of this comparison. Columns 1, 2, 3, 
5, and 8 show the fraction of households within a particular decile of consumption per capita 
that would be selected by the given targeting tool. As column 2 shows, perfect targeting would 
select 100% of respondents in all percentiles before the cutoff point for selection (52% in Hon-
duras and 59% in Peru), and 0% afterwards. The other columns present the p-values from tests 
of equality of proportions selected between two of the targeting tools. With some exceptions—
particularly in Honduras — both tables show few consistent differences in performance among 
the targeting tools and between each targeting tool and a mere random selection.  
In Honduras, there is some evidence both for differences between each targeting tool and a 
random sample and among targeting tools. Each targeting tool significantly outperforms the 
random sample in at least three deciles, concentrated in one or both tails; the PPI performs the 
best, with favorable significant differences relative to random sampling in six of the 10 deciles 
(mostly in the tails: deciles 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10). Among targeting tools, no tool significantly outper-
forms the other in more than two deciles. Here too, significant differences generally emerge in 
the tails—all four differences are in the bottom or top two deciles.  Of the three tools, the TUP 
process fares the worst, with PPI and housing performing at a similar level.  
In Peru, the only test that shows more than one difference from mere random selection is 
the PPI, but of the four significant differences, only two correspond to favorable performance 
(households in the 1st and 10th deciles are more and less likely to be selected, while households 
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in the 4th and 5th decile are less likely to be selected). Of the thirty tests (3 methods x 10 deciles) 
performed that compare targeting tools to each other, only one shows a significant difference.  
Figures 1 and 2 visually depict the performance of each targeting tool using consumption 
per capita as a benchmark.10 An ideal targeting tool would have a straight line from the point 
(0,1) to (X,1), followed by a straight line from (X,0) to (0,1) (where X corresponds to the percen-
tage of households finally selected in each country). Even though each targeting tool displays a 
downward sloping trend, none comes close to the ideal values. In both graphs, there is evi-
dence that the tools perform relatively well at the tails, with the sharpest changes in slope oc-
curring at the very left and right ends of the graphs. The shape implies that the targeting tools 
are better at identifying the very poorest and the very richest than they are at correctly catego-
rizing individuals in the middle. In Honduras, the tools perform particularly well in the tails, as 
both Table 6 and Figure 1 demonstrate.  
In both graphs, no tool consistently outperforms the others. The PPI in Peru, for instance, 
outperforms the TUP process and housing index in including the very poorest, but in the rest of 
the distribution has mixed performance. The housing index in Honduras also starts out well 
beginning in the left tail and through the ninth decile rivals the other tools, but then rises for 
the last decile, including a higher proportion of wealthy households.  
Taken together, the two figures paint a mixed picture: while the targeting tools each per-
form slightly better than random selection—particularly in the tails and in Honduras—their rel-
ative performance shows few consistent patterns.  
6 Other definitions of poverty 
For the reasons outlined in section 5.1, we present our results using consumption per capita 
as “the” measure of poverty with some caution. Moreover, even if consumption per capita is 
the best proxy for poverty, given measurement error, other measures may shed light on the 
relative performance of targeting tools. Tables 7 and 8 thus extend the comparison of TUP with 
other targeting tools by examining each tool’s performance using additional benchmarks for 
poverty. Each cell shows among households selected by the targeting method in the column 
heading the percentage of households that rank in the bottom X% (52% in Honduras and 59% in 
10 The graphs depict fractions of non-parametrically estimated density functions. Because of the non-
parametric smoothing, they do no perfectly map into the fractions in Tables 5 and 6. 
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Peru) according to the poverty metric on the left. As before, we compare the targeting tools to 
random selection, which would select X% of households in the bottom X% of the poverty distri-
bution for each metric. A perfect targeting tool would only select those bottom X%; hence, the 
number selected for each metric is 100%.  
In the first row of the tables we show how each tool fares on average for consumption per 
capita. The results mirror the trends from Tables 5 and 6: among random selection, TUP, the 
housing index, and PPI, there are no significant differences in Peru, while all targeting tools per-
form better than random selection in Honduras, but no significant differences exist among 
them.  
Clearer differences emerge among the tools when the asset index is used as a benchmark. 
In Honduras, each tool outperforms the random sample on average (all three tests have p-
values <0.01), and TUP and PPI both fare better than the housing index (66% vs. 58%, p-
value<0.01 and 67% vs. 58%, p-value<0.01, respectively). The same trend exists in Peru (71% vs. 
64%, p-value=0.02 and 72% vs. 64%, p-value=0.02, respectively), except that the housing index 
underperforms relative to random selection.   
A similar trend exists among the tools and in each country when using the total value of an-
imals and total cultivated land as benchmarks. In both countries, the relative ranking for each 
measure for the three tools is the same. For Honduras and Peru, respectively, the percent cor-
rectly identified as poor, using total value of animals, is TUP (66% and 70%) > PPI (62% and 61%) 
> Housing (56% and 58%) > random (52% and 59%). Similarly, for total cultivated land as the 
“true” measure of poverty, the success rates for Honduras and Peru, respectively, are TUP (61% 
and 66%) > PPI (58% and 63%) > Housing (53% and 59%) > random (52% and 59%). These re-
sults suggest that for assets, total value of livestock, and total value of cultivated land, TUP gen-
erally outperforms random selection and the housing index, and is slightly better than the PPI.  
Few consistent differences among the tools appear when vulnerability to reductions in food 
consumption11 and years of education of the household head are each used as the true meas-
ure of poverty. In Honduras, each of the tools is significantly better than random selection for 
both metrics and the TUP process and the PPI generally outperform the housing index. In Peru, 
11 As a measure of vulnerability to reductions in food consumption, we use an index based on questions in the 
survey about whether adults in the household reduced or skipped meals, did not eat for an entire day or whether 
meals were reduced for children in the past 12 months, and the frequency of these events. 
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no tool does better than random selection for the two metrics, except for the housing index 
when the education metric is used.  
Overall, the comparison unveils two insights into the TUP selection process. First, when 
judged using six different poverty metrics, the TUP process typically performs better than ran-
dom selection. Second, the TUP process, compared to PPI and the Housing index, leads to se-
lecting households with fewer assets, less land, and less valuable livestock.  
Figures 3 and 4 capture TUP’s performance visually. The graphs plot the percentage of 
households selected by the TUP targeting process against the rank of those households accord-
ing to three metrics of poverty: the asset index, consumption, and vulnerability to reductions in 
food consumption. TUP performs best according to the asset index in Peru and Honduras, 
showing a consistent negative slope from including poor households on the left to excluding 
rich households on the right.  A similar, but weaker, trend exists for consumption. The TUP 
process shows an inverse relationship between vulnerability and selection in Peru and a direct, 
but weak relationship in Honduras. 
7 Understanding PWR rankings  
TUP’s favorable performance along some poverty indicators, but not others, makes poig-
nant the question of what observable information predicts how village members categorize 
households. Tables 9 and 10 analyze these criteria by regressing a household’s group number 
(ranking) in the PWR on a host of covariates. Column 1 shows the results of this regression, 
while column 2 displays results from the same regression with different outcome variables se-
lection by the complete TUP process as the outcome variable.  
With the six poverty metrics and other covariates included in one regression, the PWR 
process shows trends consistent with earlier results: households with a lower score on the as-
set index in Honduras and Peru and households with less livestock and land in Peru are more 
likely to be ranked as poor, while there is no difference in the rankings among households ac-
cording to their vulnerability to reductions in food consumption. In both countries, the educa-
tion level of the household head is a statistically significant explanatory variable. Several other 
covariates are statistically significant, especially in Peru, indicating that, conditional on the po-
verty metrics, villagers take into account other characteristics when ranking households. In 
Honduras household size and having savings make a household less likely to be categorized as 
poor, whereas the household head being a widower has the opposite effect. In Peru, household 
size, and the household head being over 60 years old make a household less like likely to be 
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categorized as poor in the PWR, while households with heads under 30 are more likely to be 
categorized as poor. 
Interestingly, in Peru, the PWR ranking favors households that have received support from 
NGOs or from the government in the past year. Assuming these NGOs are effectively targeting 
poor households, this result may not come as a surprise. On the other hand, perhaps house-
holds that receive support from NGOs are thereafter branded as poor and hence more likely to 
be ranked as such by other village members, irrespective of their wealth. Or some households 
may simply be more successful in garnering support from outside organizations, which could 
filter through in the PWR process. In line with the latter interpretation, we find in Peru that 
households that have higher degrees of social integration are more likely to be ranked as poor. 
As measures of social integration, the Peru regressions include a community participation in-
dex12, the number of potential lenders someone could rely on in times of need and the number 
of times someone attended community meetings.13 Both the community participation index 
and the number of potential lenders in the community are positively correlated with the like-
lihood of being categorized as poor. Though not definitive evidence, this is suggestive of elite 
capture. 
8 Policy implications and conclusion 
Data from household surveys of selected and excluded households in the targeting process 
for the Graduation Program support the effectiveness of PWRs in sorting households by poverty 
status. The subsequent step in the TUP targeting process—the verification step—produced 
fewer and smaller differences between selected and excluded households, but seems to have 
filtered some wealthy households out of the group selected in the PWR step. Looking beyond 
average differences to benchmark the TUP method against the distribution of consumption per 
capita shows that the TUP process fares poorly, but is mostly indistinguishable from two alter-
native targeting methods based on proxy means testing. Differences that do emerge surface 
within the tails of the consumption distribution.  
This raises the question of why, given that households in these close-knit communities are 
likely to know each other very well, the PWR is not more accurate. One explanation finds sup-
12 The community participation index is an index of participation in a range of community-based organizations. 
13 Unfortunately, these variables are not available for the Honduras sample. 
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port in our analysis that uses alternative poverty metrics: when compared against asset, land, 
and livestock ownership, both the TUP process and PPI method outperform random selection 
and the housing index. This demonstrates that local definitions of poverty incorporate variables 
other than consumption. Results from a multivariate regression controlling for consumption 
also reinforce this point, as asset ownership, livestock ownership, and education predict the 
rank in the PWR in both countries, after controlling for consumption. Moreover, conditional on 
poverty metrics, the PWR ranking is correlated with household head traits, prior support from 
NGOs and government and community participation. Noticeably absent from the list of predic-
tors of the PWR ranking is vulnerability to reductions in food consumption.  
Ultimately, the decision on what mechanism to use to target should be driven by a cost-
benefit analysis. Table 11 provides an analysis of the estimated cost of each of the methods, in 
both countries. The TUP targeting process (both the participatory wealth ranking and the verifi-
cation step) costs about US$7 per selected household, whereas the PPI or housing index would 
cost about US$5.5 per selected household. Thus the approaches have quite similar costs, but 
the TUP targeting process is the most expense. That cost is divided almost equally, half coming 
from the PWR and half from the verification step.14 Thus if the verification step was deemed 
unnecessary (and our evidence suggests it contributed little to the poverty targeting), the PWR 
method would be substantially cheaper than the PPI or housing index methods which require 
household visits.15  
Of course, the relative costs of the different targeting methods are a function of context-
specific parameters such as the average number of households in a community and the percen-
tage of targeted households. In Figures 5 and 6, we plot the (hypothetical) targeting cost per 
selected household as a function of these parameters for the Peruvian case – fixing the other 
parameters at their observed values. As seen in Figure 5, the PWR is substantially cheaper than 
the PPI/housing index independent of the percentage of households that is targeted (for an 
observed average village size of slightly under 100 households). Figure 6 shows however that 
14 The PPI/housing index and the verification step both make use of short household surveys. The cost of the 
verification survey is lower than the PPI/housing index survey because the verification survey includes only house-
holds selected in the PWR step. 
15 Our analysis focused on the poverty dimension of the targeting process and showed that the verification 
step contributed little to the poverty targeting. As mentioned above, the verification step also served a second 
objective, to verify a household’s programmatic eligibility. If the verification step were deemed unnecessary, the 
screening of the programmatic criteria could be made part of the PWR process. 
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this relationship does not hold for small villages (less than 60 households) where the 
PPI/housing index is cheaper than the PWR. As village size increases, the PWR becomes cheaper 
relative to the PPI/housing index because the marginal cost of ranking one more household in 
the PWR is close to zero. 
On the benefit side, the benefits of one approach versus another depend critically on the 
social welfare function one is maximizing, and implicitly from that, what the lost benefits are 
from resources “wasted” on delivering services to untargeted individuals. For instance, some-
one who is barely above the bar (thus not “ultra-poor” in a binary sense) still would benefit 
from the program and serve the greater social purpose of the program, just not as much as the 
person categorized as ultra-poor. In future work, we will examine the impact of the overall TUP 
program, and as part of that analysis, we will examine heterogeneity in impact with respect to 
baseline wealth.  
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1 Total households in sample 1060 100%
2 Excluded for not having child under 18 in house 85 11%
3 Excluded for having lived in the village for 3 years or less 20 2%
4 Households identified as poor in the PWR step and not interviewed in verification step 60 10%
5 Total households in analysis sample 897 77%
PWR step
6 Total households in analysis sample 897 100%
7 Considered non-poor in the PWR 195 38%
8 Considered poor in the PWR 702 62%
Verification step
9 Considered poor in the PWR 702 62%
10 Excluded for having monthly income per capita of more than L. 600 24 3%
11 Not meeting 2 or more of the criteria below (12-14) 28 4%
12 Doesn't meet "7000 m2 or less land under cultivation" 71 8%
13 Doesn't meet "minors working in income-generating or other productive activities" 372 34%
14 Doesn’t meet "not participating in a development program" 7 1%
15 Finally selected 635 52%
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1 Total households in sample 1007 100%
2 Excluded b/c household head spends more than 6 months a year outside village 16 2%
3 Excluded b/c household head and spouse over 60 111 20%
4 Excluded for not having child under 18 in house 214 38%
5 Households identified as poor in the PWR step and not interviewed in verification step 39 5%
6 Total households in analysis sample 717 51%
PWR step
7 Total households in analysis sample 717 100%
8 Considered non-poor in the PWR 154 36%
9 Considered poor in the PWR 563 64%
Verification step
10 Considered poor in the PWR 563 73%
11 Excluded for having a second home 5 1%
12 Excluded for having a formal job 1 0%
13 Excluded for having a formal loan 9 2%
14 Excluded for PPI score > 30 16 3%
15 Finally selected 536 59%
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Table 3: Selection at each stage of TUP targeting process - Honduras













PWR step Verif. Step
Panel A: Demographics and education
Female-headed household 0.11 0.14 -0.10 0.15 0.14 0.03 0.12 0.14 -0.07 114% -14%
(0.31) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.32) (0.35)
Years of education of household head 1.28 0.84 *** 0.51 0.92 0.83 0.11 1.20 0.83 *** 0.44 91% 9%
(1.02) (0.66) (0.78) (0.64) (0.98) (0.64)
School enrollment (boys: 12-17 years) 0.54 0.39 *** 0.30 0.61 0.36 ** 0.51 0.55 0.36 *** 0.38 70% 30%
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.48)
School enrollment (girls: 12-17 years) 0.59 0.44 ** 0.30 0.44 0.43 0.02 0.55 0.43 ** 0.24 97% 3%
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Panel B: Household assets
Household has radio 0.82 0.71 *** 0.25 0.74 0.70 0.10 0.80 0.70 *** 0.23 85% 15%
(0.39) (0.45) (0.44) (0.46) (0.40) (0.46)
Household has bicylce 0.26 0.14 *** 0.30 0.12 0.15 -0.06 0.23 0.15 *** 0.21 109% -9%
(0.44) (0.35) (0.33) (0.35) (0.42) (0.35)
Asset index 1.90 -0.15 *** 0.85 0.27 -0.23 ** 0.21 1.56 -0.23 *** 0.74 90% 10%
(2.78) (1.75) (1.77) (1.74) (2.69) (1.74)
Latrine with water or septic tank 0.73 0.41 *** 0.57 0.57 0.38 ** 0.35 0.70 0.38 *** 0.56 79% 21%
(0.55) (0.56) (0.59) (0.55) (0.56) (0.55)
Housing index 1.12 -0.30 *** 0.96 -0.01 -0.36 ** 0.24 0.88 -0.36 *** 0.83 90% 10%
(1.56) (1.14) (1.20) (1.11) (1.56) (1.11)
Panel C: Productive assets and income
Total cultivated land (m2) 9632 5521 *** 0.40 6892 5244 * 0.16 9040 5244 *** 0.37 85% 15%
(12527) (8347) (6680) (8622) (11570) (8622)
Number of cattle 0.50 0.08 *** 0.37 0.06 0.08 -0.02 0.40 0.08 *** 0.28 102% -2%
(1.61) (0.69) (0.32) (0.74) (1.44) (0.74)
Number of sheep/goats 0.02 0.04 -0.09 0.08 0.03 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.00 -1650% 1750%
(0.14) (0.29) (0.36) (0.27) (0.21) (0.27)
Total weekly income per capita (Lempiras) 74.98 50.59 *** 0.30 46.74 51.35 -0.06 68.89 51.35 ** 0.22 109% -9%
(98.65) (66.09) (55.79) (67.96) (91.83) (67.96)
Household has business 0.19 0.10 *** 0.26 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.17 0.10 ** 0.20 99% 1%
(0.39) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.37) (0.30)
Panel D: Consumption, poverty and vulnerability
Total weekly consumption per adult equivalent (Lempiras) 166.91 128.49 *** 0.32 148.03 124.53 0.20 162.81 124.53 *** 0.32 79% 21%
(120.23) (118.01) (230.51) (77.11) (151.17) (77.11)
Household below $1.25 poverty line 0.33 0.47 *** -0.29 0.45 0.48 -0.06 0.36 0.48 *** -0.25 91% 9%
(0.47) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50)
Total ppi score 36.37 32.08 *** 0.40 33.64 31.77 0.17 35.78 31.77 *** 0.37 84% 16%
(11.67) (9.86) (10.30) (9.75) (11.44) (9.75)
Food security index 0.52 -0.02 *** 0.35 0.39 -0.09 ** 0.31 0.49 -0.09 *** 0.38 73% 27%
(1.29) (1.62) (1.34) (1.66) (1.30) (1.66)
Number of observations 195 702 . 67 635 . 262 635
PWR step Contributions to final selectionVerification step Final selection
Statistical signficance denoted * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. The p-values are based on robust estimates of the standard errors. Columns (4), (8) and (12) show the standardized difference between the means of the
excluded and selected groups, i.e. the difference divided by the overall standard deviation of the variable. Columns (13) and (14) indicate the relative contribution of the PWR and verification steps. Let M¬ be the
mean of the variable of interest, M¬1 its mean conditional on being selected in the PWR step and M2 the mean conditional on being finally selected, the contribution of the PWR is then defined as (M-M1)/(M-M2)
and the contribution of the verification step as (M1-M2)/(M-M2).
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Table 4: Selection at each stage of TUP targeting process - Peru

















Panel A: Demographics and education
Female headed household 0.06 0.13 * -0.22 0.14 0.13 0.03 0.07 0.13 * -0.18 103% -3%
(0.24) (0.33) (0.35) (0.33) (0.26) (0.33)
Years of education of household head 6.33 5.21 *** 0.31 6.42 5.10 0.37 6.35 5.10 *** 0.35 79% 21%
(3.44) (3.63) (4.26) (3.55) (3.55) (3.55)
School enrollment (boys: 12-17 years) 0.98 0.95 * 0.17 0.94 0.95 -0.04 0.97 0.95 0.14 107% -7%
(0.14) (0.14) (0.24) (0.22) (0.16) (0.22)
School enrollment (girls: 12-17 years) 0.93 0.89 0.14 1.00 0.88 * 0.40 0.94 0.88 0.19 67% 33%
(0.26) (0.26) -  (0.32) (0.25) (0.32)
Panel B: Household assets
Household has radio 0.98 0.95 * 0.13 0.91 0.95 -0.22 0.97 0.95 0.07 164% -64%
(0.15) (0.22) (0.29) (0.21) (0.18) (0.21)
Household has bicylce 0.68 0.48 *** 0.41 0.42 0.48 -0.12 0.65 0.48 *** 0.34 107% -7%
(0.47) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50)
Asset index 1.33 -0.15 *** 0.65 0.64 -0.22 0.38 1.24 -0.22 *** 0.64 88% 12%
(1.73) (2.37) (2.54) (2.35) (1.87) (2.35)
Latrine with water or septic tank 0.22 0.25 -0.07 0.18 0.26 -0.19 0.22 0.26 -0.10 94% 6%
(0.42) (0.43) (0.38) (0.44) (0.41) (0.44)
Housing index 0.40 0.00 *** 0.34 0.11 -0.01 0.10 0.37 -0.01 *** 0.32 94% 6%
(1.00) (1.22) (0.98) (1.24) (1.00) (1.24)
Panel C: Productive assets and income
Total cultivated land (m2) 8144 4134 *** 0.55 4091 4138 -0.01 7626 4138 *** 0.48 100% 0%
(8730) (5793) (3335) (5966) (8348) (5966)
Number of cattle 4.59 2.39 *** 0.89 2.92 2.34 0.23 4.38 2.34 *** 0.82 94% 6%
(2.85) (1.81) (2.14) (1.77) (2.82) (1.77)
Number of sheep/goats 13.31 11.30 0.13 6.15 11.75 *** -0.36 12.42 11.75 0.04 264% -164%
(17.23) (14.37) (10.95) (14.55) (16.74) (14.55)
Total weekly income per capita (Lempiras) 21.56 21.33 0.01 22.25 21.25 0.03 21.65 21.25 0.01 51% 49%
(27.16) (30.84) (23.07) (31.44) (26.65) (31.44)
Household has business 0.28 0.14 *** 0.37 0.23 0.13 0.26 0.28 0.13 *** 0.38 86% 14%
(0.45) (0.34) (0.42) (0.34) (0.45) (0.34)
Panel D: Consumption, poverty and vulnerability
Total weekly consumption per adult equivalent (Soles) 43.87 36.67 ** 0.31 31.40 37.10 -0.24 42.38 37.10 ** 0.23 120% -20%
(25.63) (21.56) (18.20) (21.76) (25.17) (21.76)
Household below $1.25 poverty line 0.13 0.26 *** -0.32 0.35 0.25 0.25 0.16 0.25 * -0.23 120% -20%
(0.34) (0.44) (0.48) (0.43) (0.36) (0.43)
Total ppi score 17.69 16.15 ** 0.21 19.46 15.85 * 0.48 17.92 15.85 *** 0.27 65% 35%
(7.13) (7.67) (9.48) (7.43) (7.48) (7.43)
Food security index -0.12 0.07 -0.12 0.01 0.07 -0.04 -0.11 0.07 -0.11 93% 7%
(1.68) (1.57) (1.46) (1.57) (1.65) (1.57)
Number of observations 154 563 27 536 181 536
PWR step Verification step Final selection Contributions to 
final selection
Statistical signficance denoted * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. The p-values are based on robust estimates of the standard errors. Columns (4), (8) and (12) show the standardized difference between the means
of the excluded and selected groups, i.e. the difference divided by the overall standard deviation of the variable. Columns (13) and (14) indicate the relative contribution of the PWR and verification steps. Let
M¬ be the mean of the variable of interest, M¬1 its mean conditional on being selected in the PWR step and M2 the mean conditional on being finally selected, the contribution of the PWR is then defined as
(M-M1)/(M-M2) and the contribution of the verification step as (M1-M2)/(M-M2).
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Table 5: Mistargeting of different selection methods by consumption decile - Honduras
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)






























1st decile 52% 100% 54% 0.64 69% 0.00 0.04 72% 0.00 0.02 0.59 95
2nd decile 52% 100% 57% 0.38 67% 0.01 0.17 54% 0.69 0.66 0.09 91
3rd decile 52% 100% 61% 0.12 64% 0.04 0.75 63% 0.05 0.86 0.92 95
4th decile 52% 100% 56% 0.53 55% 0.56 0.95 68% 0.00 0.16 0.08 88
5th decile 52% 100% 65% 0.03 55% 0.55 0.16 54% 0.63 0.14 0.92 96
6th decile 52% 20% 59% 0.20 54% 0.67 0.48 54% 0.62 0.53 0.93 93
7th decile 52% 0% 46% 0.35 52% 0.88 0.36 53% 0.87 0.43 0.99 84
8th decile 52% 0% 47% 0.42 43% 0.15 0.59 40% 0.06 0.41 0.73 82
9th decile 52% 0% 39% 0.04 27% 0.00 0.02 29% 0.00 0.14 0.83 77
10th decile 52% 0% 30% 0.00 29% 0.00 0.79 28% 0.00 0.64 0.82 70
This table compares the complete TUP selection process to alternative targeting procedures: a housing index and the PPI score. Households were ranked according
to per capita consumption and for each decile of the consumption distribution, we calculate the % of households that were (or would have been) selected by each of
the methods. Since the complete selection process identified the poorest 52% and not a complete ranking, the housing index and PPI methods mimick that selection,
i.e. a household is selected if it ranks among the 52% lowest scoring households.
Table 6: Mistargeting of different selection methods by consumption decile - Peru
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)






























1st decile 59% 100% 70% 0.37 72% 0.27 0.77 77% 0.10 0.29 0.31 53
2nd decile 59% 100% 62% 0.64 65% 0.33 0.77 68% 0.14 0.52 0.71 68
3rd decile 59% 100% 70% 0.22 55% 0.62 0.03 62% 0.71 0.17 0.26 80
4th decile 59% 100% 56% 0.71 58% 0.93 0.82 47% 0.08 0.22 0.19 66
5th decile 59% 100% 51% 0.38 60% 0.94 0.54 46% 0.10 0.49 0.28 67
6th decile 59% 100% 57% 0.85 62% 0.77 0.73 58% 0.91 0.95 0.83 63
7th decile 59% 40% 70% 0.11 60% 0.88 0.30 62% 0.62 0.37 0.81 76
8th decile 59% 0% 48% 0.20 54% 0.60 0.54 66% 0.36 0.21 0.37 64
9th decile 59% 0% 64% 0.47 63% 0.51 0.90 54% 0.44 0.33 0.22 72
10th decile 59% 0% 40% 0.02 41% 0.04 0.87 41% 0.07 0.91 0.99 57
This table compares the complete TUP selection process to alternative targeting procedures: a housing index and the PPI score. Households were ranked according
to per capita consumption and for each decile of the consumption distribution, we calculate the % of households that were (or would have been) selected by each of
the methods. Since the complete selection process identified the poorest 52% and not a complete ranking, the housing index and PPI methods mimick that selection,
i.e. a household is selected if it ranks among the 52% lowest scoring households.
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Table 7: Poverty rates among targeted households using different poverty metrics - Honduras
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)























Total weekly consumption per adult 
equivalent 52% 100% 58% 0.00 62% 0.00 0.15 61% 0.00 0.14 0.86
Asset index 52% 100% 66% 0.00 58% 0.01 0.00 67% 0.00 0.64 0.00
Vulnerability to reductions in food 
consumption 52% 100% 59% 0.00 56% 0.06 0.25 60% 0.00 0.65 0.09
Total value of livestock owned 52% 100% 66% 0.00 56% 0.08 0.00 62% 0.00 0.07 0.01
Total cultivated land 52% 100% 61% 0.00 53% 0.64 0.00 58% 0.01 0.20 0.01
Education level of household head 52% 100% 59% 0.00 54% 0.36 0.03 58% 0.01 0.66 0.05
This table shows poverty rates among targeted households for each of the targeting methods (column) using different poverty metrics (row). Since the complete
selection process identified the poorest 52%, a household is considered poor according to each of the metrics if it ranks among the 52% lowest scoring
households on the metric.
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Table 8: Poverty rates among targeted households using different poverty metrics - Peru
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)























Weekly consumption per adult equivalent 59% 100% 61% 0.42 61% 0.55 0.99 62% 0.39 0.81 0.82
Asset index 59% 100% 71% 0.00 64% 0.19 0.02 72% 0.00 0.71 0.02
Vulnerability to reductions in food consumption 59% 100% 58% 0.71 58% 0.81 0.92 57% 0.60 0.77 0.72
Total value of livestock owned 59% 100% 70% 0.00 58% 0.75 0.00 61% 0.65 0.00 0.40
Total cultivated land 59% 100% 66% 0.00 59% 0.92 0.01 63% 0.28 0.22 0.21
Education level of household head 59% 100% 63% 0.19 67% 0.01 0.09 59% 0.93 0.25 0.01
This table shows poverty rates among targeted households for each of the targeting methods (column) using different poverty metrics (row). Since the complete
selection process identified the poorest 59%, a household is considered poor according to each of the metrics if it ranks among the 59% lowest scoring households on
the metric.
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Table 9: Regressions - Honduras
(1) (2)







Total weekly consumption per adult equivalent (L 100) -0.04 -0.03*
(0.03) (0.01)
Asset index -0.16*** -0.05***
(0.02) (0.01)
Vulnerability to reductions in food consumption 0.00 0.02*
(0.02) (0.01)
Total value of livestock owned (L 10000) -0.04 0.00
(0.05) (0.03)
Total cultivated land (ha) -0.05 -0.03*
(0.04) (0.02)
Education level of household head -0.12*** -0.06**
(0.04) (0.02)
Other covariates
Household size -0.04*** -0.01*
(0.02) (0.01)
Household head under 30 0.05 0.08
(0.10) (0.05)
Household head over 60 -0.12 -0.08
(0.11) (0.06)
Household head is widow(er) 0.23* 0.10
(0.13) (0.06)
Household received transfer from another hh last year -0.06 -0.05
(0.08) (0.04)
Household received support from government last year 0.09 0.01
(0.08) (0.04)
Household received support from NGO last year 0.15 -0.01
(0.10) (0.05)
Household holds savings -0.21** -0.08
(0.10) (0.05)




Number of observations 834 834
OLS estimates with robust standard errors. Statistical signficance denoted * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
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Table 10: Regressions - Peru
(1) (2)







Total weekly consumption per adult equivalent (10 S) -0.04* -0.03***
(0.02) (0.01)
Asset index -0.06*** -0.03***
(0.02) (0.01)
Vulnerability to reductions in food consumption -0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
Total value of livestock owned (1000 S) -0.10*** -0.03***
(0.02) (0.01)
Total cultivated land (ha) -0.11*** -0.04
(0.04) (0.03)
Education level of household head -0.03*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01)
Other covariates
Household size -0.03* -0.02**
(0.02) (0.01)
Household head under 30 0.40*** 0.11**
(0.10) (0.05)
Household head over 60 -0.32* -0.22***
(0.19) (0.08)
Household head is widow(er) 0.08 -0.01
(0.11) (0.06)
Household received transfer from another hh last year 0.03 0.03
(0.09) (0.05)
Household received support from government last year 0.26*** 0.12**
(0.09) (0.05)
Household received support from NGO last year 0.17** 0.03
(0.08) (0.04)
Household holds savings 0.16* 0.09**
(0.08) (0.04)
Household took loan in past 12 months 0.04 -0.02
(0.09) (0.04)
Household suffered an income shock in the past 12 months 0.08 0.15***
(0.07) (0.04)
Communal participation index 0.04** 0.03***
(0.02) (0.01)
Number of potential lenders in the community (for S/. 50) 0.02* 0.01**
(0.01) (0.01)
Number of times attended communal meetings in past 12 months -0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)




Number of observations 635 635












Two step targeting $33,127 $3.85 $7.4 $26,372 $3.30 $6.34
PWR $16,340 $1.90 $3.7 $13,333 $1.67 $3.21
Verification $16,787 $1.95 $3.8 $13,038 $1.63 $3.13
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Figure 1: Comparing TUP to other targeting methods - Honduras
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Households ranked according to per capita consumption
Figure 2: Comparing TUP to other targeting methods - Peru
      
Random Perfect TUP
Housing index PPI score
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